

Zero Trust:

The modern way of achieving the least privilege principles

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Uber details how it got hacked, claims limited damage



While there's no evidence the rideshare company's codebase was altered, the attacker did gain access to Slack, vulnerability reports and financial data.

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Matt Kapko Reporter
















The @Uber breach reads like a 101 of the modern fundamentals: infected device, stolen credentials, annoying 2FA prompts, privilege escalation, etc

The mechanics of a sophisticated phishing scam and how we stopped it



10/08/2022






Matthew Prince Daniel Stinson-Diess




This post is also available in 简体中文, 日本語 and Español.



What Cloudflare employees saw







Threat actor attempted cred harvesting playbook




but was unsuccessful gaining full access

[1-2] Targeted text messages

[3-4] Sophisticated real-time phishing

[5-6] Remote access payload



Threat actor sent legitimate-looking malicious SMS Company employees and family members received SMS on personal & work phone #s Message included a legitimate-looking newly registered domain (cloudflare-okta.com)	
Maccago included a logitimate-looking newly registered demain (cloudflare-okta.com)	
2a Message included a legitimate-looking newly registered domain (cloudflare-okta.com)	
2b Clicking link opened a legitimate-looking phishing site (Cloudflare Okta login page)	
3a Victim's entered credentials were immediately relayed to the threat actor	
Threat actor enters credentials received into actual identity provider (IdP) login site; sending TOTP codes to victims via SMS or mobile app	
3b Victim enters TOTP code on the phishing site, and it too would be relayed to the threat actor	or
Threat actor enters code in IdP site before it expires	
5 Phishing site initiated download of a phishing payload (may have been due to a misconfigure	ed kit)
6 Once software installs, threat actor controls victims' machine remotely	

Despite threat actor technical sophistication,


Cloudflare was protected as we do not rely on TOTP

codes

[1-2] Targeted text messages

[3-4] Sophisticated real-time phishing

[5-6] Remote access payload



#	Technical details
1	● 100+ messages sent from four T-Mobile-issued SIM cards ● 76+ employees received in <1 min
2	 Domain registered via "Porkbun" <40 min before phishing campaign to avoid automated detection Site had a Nuxt.js frontend, a Django backend, and was hosted on DigitalOcean
3	 Telegram messaging service provided real-time relay 3 employees reached this step, but did not go further as security keys don't use TOTP
4	 Okta generates a TOTP code sent to the employee via SMS or mobile app Defeats most 2FA implementations
5	Included AnyDesk remote access software
6	n/a

Cloudflare's Zero Trust platform played a role in mitigating this and similar attacks




[1-2] Targeted text

messages

[3-4] Sophisticated real-time phishing

[5-6] Remote access payload




#	Our response
1	● 1 min after attack, SIRT was informed; no evidence of compromise via directory provider logs
	● 9 min after attack, SIRT sent an internal warning to all employees across chat & email
	● 3 min after attack, SIRT added domain to SWG to block access.
2	Later, isolated access to all newly registered domains and seized control of domain.
	● 37 min after attack, DigitalOcean shutdown the attacker's server via our collaboration
3	● 1-37 min after attack, SIRT killed active sessions via ZTNA, plus 48 min after attack, SIRT reset
	credentials & initiated scans for the identities & devices with unverified 2FA per our activity logs
	• Intel from server indicated actor was targeting other orgs, including Twilio, and SIRT shared intel
4	● SIRT blocked IPs used by threat actor from accessing any Cloudflare service
5	n/a
6	Note: Endpoint security used by Cloudflare would have stopped the installation

Reinforced the importance of what we're doing well, stopped and everything you can do, too

CLOUDFLARE

- 1 Adopt a phishing-resistant MFA
 Not all MFA provides the same level of security
- 2 Implement selective enforcement with identity- and context-centric policies
- 3 Enforce strong auth everywhere
 All users and apps; even legacy non-web systems
- Adopt Zero Trust via one platform
 Easier, faster operations & improved security
 posture
- Establish paranoid, blame-free culture
 Report suspicions early and often



The Perimeter as we know it, is under Attack...

Critical Vulnerability in Citrix Application Delivery Controller, Gateway, and Survey Wanter





ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances
 ASA 5500-X Series Next-Generation Firewalls




Alert (AA20-020A)

Print Tweet Send Share

Original release date: January 20, 2020 | Last revised: May 21, 2020


... and so are the apps inside the corporate

CLOUDFLARE




In most cases, you become a target by accident...





Sample Query for Pulse Secure





In most cases, you become a target by accident...



```
meh@ubuntu16:~/pulse_demo$ python pulse_pwn.py https://
    Checking environment
    Date = Thu, 13 Dec 2018 05:34:28 GMT
    Version = 9.0.3.64015
   OK, is vulnerable
   Exploiting CVE-2019-11510 arbirary file reading
    Extract admin name = [orange]
   Extract admin hash = [b6a5a868b1befadee21b632b76ff73d9c294a43563646abf70bb88d2373ac9c5]
   Could not find plaintext password in cache :(
   Extract admin DSID = [31a8ae6051a44eca74de8bcd159b0462]
meh@ubuntu16:~/pulse_demo$
```

Patching Vulnerabilities takes TIME...

7% 12% 13% 23%

Singapore

India

Australia

CVSS Score

% of devices still vulnerable 5 months after patch released







Zero Trust is a mindset shift



Never trust, always verify

Assume risk & reduce impact

Default deny + least privilege access

Context based (identity, posture etc)

Prevent lateral movement







Zero Trust



- Context
- Identity (requestor)

- Posture check
- Isolation

- No lateral movement
- Micro segmentation

- Enables Any-to-Any
- Protect UsersDevice & Apps

For analogy purpose only






















Secure Access Service Edge (SASE)

Drop bags in the taxi, Get it at Hotel Fastest route to airport. Traffic intelligence Express Entry at airport Pre-Identity authorization Early boarding

Best seats

Rental Car Navigation, Toll pass Easy hotel check-in Customized excursions

Exceptional vacation experience(safe, fast, reliable)

One portal, friction less travel, safety first, direct flights, customized restaurant, excursions & many more

Cloudflar



275+

cities in 100+ countries, including mainland China

11,000+


networks directly connect to Cloudflare, including ISPs, cloud providers & large enterprises

155 Tbps


of network edge capacity & growing


















There is no longer a business & technology strategy.


There is a strategy & technology is driving it.



Legacy networks & products are not built to support your digital future




Solution for future success?



Any-to-Any | End-to-End | Internet Native | Single Platform | Composable Services



Solution for future success?




Path to the cloud needs to have same characteristics as the cloud



Cloudflare is secure, fast, reliable, any-to-any & end-to-end, composable

One management plane, One control plane to one data plane with single-pass inspection




CLOUDFLARE

275 cities (100 countries) • ~50ms from 95% of Internet population 11,000 interconnects •155 Tbps capacity network onramps

Cloudflare enables cafe experience for corporate apps





Simplify application access

Distribute(CDN) & protect applications

Apply consistent ZT based policies

Protect users and endpoints

Enhance end user experience



Business drivers and Zero Trust outcomes

Discover & monitor attack surface


Authorize access based on context, reduce blast radius Ensure plug & play infrastructure

Manage IT fatique

Improve customer experience

1 Reduce attack surface

91%↓



? Reduce incident costs

35%↓



Accelerate onboarding 60%




4. Reduce IT tickets

80%



Reduce latency

39%









Recommendations for a successful Zero Trust journey

A common roadmap to Zero Trust, and eventually a complete SASE transformation



VPN replacement and augmentation



Zero Trust Network Access


Simplifies remote access

Improves user experience

Eliminates lateral movement

Built-in DDoS & FW protection

Streamline SaaS security




Cloud Access Security Broker


More visibility, less config

Prevent data exfiltration

Quickly identify new risks



Internet threat and data protection



Secure Web Gateway

Simplify policy compliance


Stop ransomware

Stop phishing

Stop shadow IT

Stop unknown threats

Perfect and simplify protection



Remote Browser Isolation


Zero trust web browsing and email links

Protect data-in-use

Lightning-fast UX

Compatibility w/all browsers

Extending Zero Trust principles to email



Cloud Email Security with RBI integration

Stop multi-channel phishing attacks pre/at/post-delivery


Stop BEC attacks using contextual relationships


Eliminate lateral movement across inboxes



Zero Trust for all internal and external network, web and email traffic









	Component	Goal Le	vel of Effor
Phase 1	 Internet traffic 	Deploy global DNS filtering	1
	 Applications 	Monitor inbound emails and filter out phishing attempts	
	DLP & logs	Identify misconfig and publicly shared data in SaaS tools	
Phase 2	Users	Establish corporate identity	111
	Users	Enforce basic MFA for all applications	
	 Applications 	Enforce HTTPS and DNSsec	
	 Internet traffic 	Block or isolate threats behind SSL	
	 Applications 	ZT policy enforcement for publicly addressable apps	
	 Applications 	Protect applications from layer 7 attacks	
	Networks	Close all inbound ports open to the Internet for app delivery	/
Phase 3	 Applications 	Inventory all corporate applications	111
	 Applications 	ZT policy enforcement for SaaS applications	
	Networks	Segment user network access	
	 Applications 	ZTNA for critical privately addressable applications	
	Devices	Implement MDM/UEM to control corporate devices	
	DLP & logs	Define what data is sensitive and where it exists	
	Users	Send out hardware based authentication tokens	
	DLP & logs	Stay up to date on known threat actors	
Phase 4	Users	Enforce hardware token based MFA	111
	 Applications 	ZT policy enforcement and network access for all application	ons
	DLP & logs	Establish a SOC for log review, policy updates and mitigation	n III
	Devices	Implement endpoint protection	
	Devices	Inventory all corporate devices, APIs and services	
	Networks	Use broadband Internet for branch to branch connectivity	
	DLP & logs	Log and review employee activity on sensitive apps	
	DLP & logs	Stop sensitive data from leaving your applications	
	Steady state	DevOps approach for policy enforcement of new resources	
	Steady state	Implement auto-scaling for on-ramp resources	

Details @ zerotrustroadmap.org



Thank you!

